产品多元化、国际化与公司绩效——来自中国制造业上市公司的经验证据

产品多元化与国际化战略是公司成长的两种重要模式.本文以2002-2004年我国制造业上市公司为研究样本,利用路径分析法对两者的关系进行实证检验后发现,公司在实施产品多元化与国际化战略的程度上呈现出正相关关系,体现了两种战略的互补效应,并且随着国际化进程的推进,这种关系更加显著.此外,利用2002-2004年三年的混合样本进行分析的结果表明,这两种战略对公司绩效的直接影响并不显著,但对公司绩效的间接影响存在着互补效应.     

基于可拓方法的合作创新知识转移主体的风险分析与评价

合作创新是21世纪增强企业竞争力和生命力的重要手段,是企业积累和创造知识的一条有效途径,本文从合作创新知识转移主体的角度分析了其所面临的关键风险因素,基于可拓评价方法的相关理论,构建了风险评估的物元模型,并通过实际应用研究,提供了该评估模型的使用方法,对企业合作创新知识转移主体面临的风险给出了定性、定量相结合的综合评价结果,为企业合作创新风险决策提供了新的思路和方法.     

企业技术创新中知识价值实现影响因素的实证研究

本研究目的在于通过实证研究确定企业技术创新中知识价值实现的关键影响因素。通过文献回顾,本文提出了企业技术创新中知识价值实现的衡量标准,构建了知识价值实现影响因素模型,并提出了10条基本假设。作者对120家企业进行了问卷调查,并运用多元回归方法分析了有效数据,结果发现学习型文化、组织距离、群体激励、知识差距和信任水平是企业技术创新中知识价值实现的关键影响因素,其中学习型文化和组织距离对目标变量影响最为显著,最后,对研究结论做了解释。     

多事业部企业内的知识转移过程及影响因素分析

事业部间的知识转移和分享,可以改进企业绩效并提升核心竞争力.本文研究了多事业部企业内的知识转移过程,得出了多事业部企业知识转移过程模型.分析了事业部间结成的知识网络,研究了网络配置和网络中事业部间的联系.分析了多事业部企业社会资本的结构维度、认知维度和关系维度,并分别从社会资本三个维度出发,提出了企业内部网络中知识转移的影响因素.     

技术中介运作及管理机制的博弈分析

目前,国内外对技术中介的市场运作机制研究较少,同时在我国技术中介在现今的技术市场运作中已出现不少问题.为研究技术中介在技术交易中的市场运作机制,本文运用博弈理论对技术市场中的买方、卖方、中介三方相互关系进行分析,首次提出了技术价值在买方、卖方之间的分配机制,明确了技术中介的收费对象,并从技术中介的运行机制分析中得出了技术中介的发展方向和管理策略.     

客户细分方法研究综述

本文研究以客户为导向的各种细分方法.首先简要描述了各种细分方法在细分维度、细分依据以及与细分目标的关联性这三个方面所表现出来的特点,同时比较了它们之间的差异;其次以维度和细分技术为主要内容对四种主要的细分方法进行了详细的叙述:人口统计细分、生活方式细分侧重维度内涵的变迁,而行为细分和利益细分则侧重细分技术的发展,尤其是利益细分;最后在结束语部分指出了现有细分方法的不足和发展方向.     

市场导向的企业运作模式

从市场对于企业的约束力量,即市场机制的作用出发,提出了造就市场的企业运作模式,即以市场导向的策略规划程序和市场营销程序为主线,以企业的基本功能为支撑,围绕市场这个中心环节,衽全方位一体化的操作过程。     

基于消费者需求与信息搜寻过程的新二维营销战略模型及验证

本项研究从消费者需求与消费者信息搜寻两个维度，将产品市场分为易识常用品市场、易识高档品市场、难识常用品市场、难识高档品市场。基于每一类产品的特征，我们提出不同产品市场的营销战略假设，然后在国内选择五个案例，对我们提出的营销战略假设进行了验证。     

Traffic‐Based Labor Planning in Retail Stores

Staffing decisions are crucial for retailers since staffing levels affect store performance and labor‐related expenses constitute one of the largest components of retailers’ operating costs. With the goal of improving staffing decisions and store performance, we develop a labor‐planning framework using proprietary data from an apparel retail chain. First, we propose a sales response function based on labor adequacy (the labor to traffic ratio) that exhibits variable elasticity of substitution between traffic and labor. When compared to a frequently used function with constant elasticity of substitution, our proposed function exploits information content from data more effectively and better predicts sales under extreme labor/traffic conditions. We use the validated sales response function to develop a data‐driven staffing heuristic that incorporates the prediction loss function and uses past traffic to predict optimal labor. In counterfactual experimentation, we show that profits achieved by our heuristic are within 0.5% of the optimal (attainable if perfect traffic information was available) under stable traffic conditions, and within 2.5% of the optimal under extreme traffic variability. We conclude by discussing implications of our findings for researchers and practitioners.     

An Experimental Investigation of Procurement Auctions with Asymmetric Sellers

Electronic reverse auctions are a commonly used procurement mechanism. Research to date has focused on suppliers who are ex ante symmetric in that their costs are drawn from a common distribution. However, in many cases, a seller's range of potential costs depends on their own operations, location, or economies of scale and scope. Thus, understanding how different bidder types impact auction outcomes is key when designing an auction. This study reports the results of the first controlled laboratory experiment designed to compare prices between first‐price and second‐price procurement auctions for homogeneous goods when seller cost types are asymmetric and the number of bidders varies. The results indicate that first‐price auctions generate lower prices regardless of market composition. The results also reveal that first‐price auctions are at least weakly more efficient than second‐price auctions despite the theoretical prediction that the reverse should hold in asymmetric auctions. Post hoc analysis of individual bidders' behavior in first‐price auctions revealed evidence that bidders systematically underbid when their cost realizations were close to the lower bound. Furthermore, bidders adjust their behavior based on the type of the other bidders in the market in a manner inconsistent with theory. Consequently, adding a third bidder to a two‐bidder market is not advantageous to the buyer unless that third bidder is a low‐cost type.